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Abstract
Theory of Mind (ToM) has repeatedly been defined as the ability to understand that
others believe their own things based on their own subjective interpretations and experiences,
and that their thoughts are determined independently from your own. In this study, we wanted to
see if individual differences in ToM are capable of causing different perceptions of an
individual’s interactions with human like robotics and highlight whether or not individual
differences in ToM account for different levels of how individuals experience what is called the
“Uncanny Valley phenomenon” and to see whether or not having a fully developed theory of
mind is essential to the perception of the interaction. This was assessed by inquiring whether or
not individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) perceive robotics and artificially
intelligent technology in the same ways that typically developed individuals do; we focused on
the growing use of social robotics in ASD therapies. Studies have indicated that differences of
ToM exist between individuals with ASD and those who are typically developed. Comparably,
we were also curious to see if differences in empathy levels also accounted for differences in
ToM and thus a difference in the perceptions of human like robotics. A robotic image rating
survey was administered to a group of University of central Florida students, as well as 2 surveys
– the Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) and the Basic Empathy Scale (BES), which helped
optimize a measurement for theory of mind. Although the results of this study did not support the
claim that individuals with ASD do not experience the uncanny valley differently than typically
developed individuals, there were significant enough results to conclude that different levels of
empathy may account for individual differences in the uncanny valley. People with low empathy
seemed to have experienced less of an uncanny valley feeling, while people with higher recorded
empathy showed to experience more of an uncanny valley sensitivity.
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Section 1: Robot Human interaction and the Uncanny Valley
There has been a growing intrigue in studies relating to the interaction between
robots/Artificially intelligent technologies over recent years. Our society has been progressing in
a way that promotes the use of computerized and animatronic object to assist us in a numerous
amount of daily tasks. It is not uncommon in this day and age to encounter a multitude of
artificially intelligent (AI) objects, many of which have been accepted and even incorporated into
daily life. Many modern devices that are automated or contain some form of AI have shown a
great deal of positive response from society, mainly due to the convenience and ease that these
objects continuously provide. A few examples of basic everyday encounters with AI include
things such as the voice activation in cell phones (i.e., the popular use of SIRI on iPhones and
Apple products) with text messaging assistance and automated responses, social media sites that
use algorithms to learn your interests and preferences in order to display advertisements that will
strike your appeal, to the multitude of technologies being incorporated into our schools,
businesses, and schools, or even video games and voice activated game consoles. Aside from
basic examples, there also exist entities that display a more complex form of AI, such as
Cleverbot - a web application that uses an intelligent algorithm that allows it to have naturalistic
conversations with humans by learning from the interaction and responses. As mentioned before,
the ease that many of these technology have added to our daily lives has made it easy for people
to accept them. According to Billings, Schaefer, Chen & Hancock (2012), one of the main
components of a successful interactions between humans and robots come from the level of trust
humans have in a particular technology to collaborate; trust that these systems will behave as
they are expected to. In a time where robots are continuing to make a transition from being
viewed as tools, to now being seen as a part of the team, trust will remain to be an essential
1

factor in that relationship. The growth of this artificially intelligent world we are adapting will
not be able to successfully thrive without trust in the systems we are choosing to accept.
It is however important, as convenient as they are, to remember that robots and
technologies dot always work 100% of the time. It’s hard to trust something that is expected to
glitch or shut down for an unknown reason. On top of a looming threat of betrayal, there are also
a few other negative aspects that have become apparent when dealing with AI and robotic
technology. In the field of human-robot interaction, there exists a phenomenon termed the
uncanny valley. While most of the population seems to have accepted many of the modern
robotics and AI that has been incorporated into our daily lives, the continuous advancement of
social robotics is something that should be addressed in terms of this phenomenon. In 1970,
Masahiro Mori, a robotics professor at the Tokyo Institute of Robotics, wrote a paper that
expressed his ideas in what he believed people’s reactions would be to robots that appeared to be
almost human. Mori’s theory suggests that, as technology and robotics start to become more
human-like, there comes a point where these artificial characters stop being so easily accepted
and start becoming more unsettling to people; this area of uncertainty and sudden rejection is
what Mori defined as the uncanny valley. Mori described the relationship of a human’s affinity
towards AI as a function of human likeness. As human likeness in a robot increases, so does a
person’s affinity towards the object. However, once the AI object reaches a specific point of
human likeness, a sudden decrease in acceptance occurs between this almost human like entity,
and the image of an actual healthy person. The sudden “dip” in the relationship that is illustrated
by Figure 1 is a visual representation of the uncanny valley (Mori, 2012). Mori further explored
this idea by explaining how people might feel when encountering a person with a very life-like
prosthetic/robotic arm. His theory continued to explain that if the motion and appearance of a
2

single prosthetic is capable of triggering negative reactions in people, then “a whole robot would
magnify the creepiness” (Mori, 2012, p. 33-35).
McDorman (2006) further explored the uncanny valley phenomenon. In this study, 56
participants proceeded to rate 13 different robots and one human in scales from unfamiliar to
familiar, not eerie to extremely eerie, and mechanical to human like. The results of this study
suggested that human like-ness was not the only influence in the perceptions of the different
constructs being measured in this experiment – rather the mechanical nature of the robots can
also elicit negative reactions. Further, this study showed stronger negative responses to videos of
moving robots compared to studies that typically used still images. The results from a more
recent study ( Jari Katsyri, Forger, Makarainen & Takala, 2015) suggested that while not all
human-likeness manipulations may cause feelings of rejection and uncertainty, manipulated
stimuli where the combination of robot and human-like features are inconsistent result in
stronger uncanny responses (i.e. human eyes on an artificial face).
The uncanny valley has proved to be present in the realm of human-robot interaction, but
it is also important to remember that while some people may experience feelings of unease and
rejection, others maybe feel it to a lesser extent, or not at all, however, there is currently no
research on identifying individual differences in terms of the uncanny valley.

3

Figure 1 the Uncanny Valley (Mori 2012)

Section II: Theory of Mind and the Uncanny Valley
Theory of Mind (ToM) has been explained as the ability to represent, conceptualize and
reason about different mental states (Schlinger 2009). A child typically develops both physically
and mentally, it is natural for them to begin to understand how the world around them works.
Alterations in ToM in a child become apparent around the age of four, when they begin to
understand themselves and own mental thought processes, as well as gain an understanding that
others are capable of going through their own independent mental processes. Furthermore, ToM
has been suspected to underlie the causes of human behaviors, as well as the activity that is seen
in one’s conscious and subconscious (Schlinger 2009). Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Firth (1985)
further continue to define ToM as “knowing that other people know, want, feel or believe things”
(Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985, p. 38). It is further explained as the ability to attribute mental states
4

to oneself and others and in turn be able to infer other people’s belief’s in regards to a specific
situation, which would then allow an individual to predict what others will do or how they will
react (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985). Humans have been linked to a natural tendency of behaving
toward others as if they possess intentions, or mind. Dennett (1987) outlines a theory that brings
to light the idea that we may never really know whether other people minds and mental
processes; weather this is true or not, we behave in a way in which we assume that they do. This
inclination has been referred to as the intentional stance (Dennett 1987). Humans are naturally
expected to attribute mind to other humans around them; but do these same principals apply
when a person comes into contact with something that appears human but in fact isn’t?
The previous section talked about the uncanny valley phenomenon, and how a feeling of
uncertainty and unease is triggered in humans when they come into contact with human/life like
robotics. Triggered by either human likeness, or a combination of both human and non-human
characteristics, there can exist several different reasons as to why this feeling is actually
manifested. It is possible that the uncanny valley feeling may be underlined by a feeling of
mistrust in the opposing entity. As mentioned earlier by Billings et al. (2009) trust in the system
is essential for a successful relationship between a human and a robot. The misleading human
like appearance and mannerisms on something that is not entirely human can cause a feeling of
distrust. The lack of consistency throughout the entity could be what causes the feeling of
uncanny. Another related reason could be the fact that when a robot approaches some level of
realism, it may lead to the tendency in others to try to attribute mind to the robot – that is, human
like appearances are associated with the ability to think (as outlined by Dennett’s (1987)
intentional stance theory).
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Section III: Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Differences in Theory of
Mind
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a term used to describe a series of complex disorders
that occur during the earlier stages of brain development. Classified as a neurodevelopmental
condition, the curious nature of this disorder has made it a widespread topic of interest and
research in recent years. Although it is linked to neurodevelopmental deficiencies as wells as
resilient underlying genetic factors, knowledge on the exact etiology of ASD is still not entirely
known (Myers & Johnson, 2007).
Autism is marked by social and cognitive impairments that are often accompanied by
abnormal displays of physical behavior or certain learning disabilities (American Psychiatric
Association (APA) 2013). The signs of autism can begin to be seen as early as six months of age
and are likely to become more apparent from ages two to three. When a child/individual is
diagnosed with autism, several factors are taken into consideration. physicians and psychologists
experts focus on the level of difficulty in social interactions, how an individual communicateswhether it’s verbal or nonverbal, and whether or not the individual demonstrates any harmful,
repetitive or compulsively unconventional behavior (Myers & Johnson, 2007). Because autism is
not limited to just one specific classification, there exists an autism spectrum, which helps
categorize each specific disorder, which has shown to be specific/unique to each individual. The
Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V), is the guideline that
is currently used by health professionals in the diagnosis of ASD. The DSM-V outlines series of
general categories, such as communication and social interactions, and arrives at a diagnosis by
specifically pinpointing certain abnormalities within each category that would indicate if an
individual falls somewhere on the autism spectrum.
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There have been studies that highlight apparent individual differences in theory of mind
between individuals with ASD and typically developed individuals. ASD is often mainly
distinguished by its significant deficits in communication and social interactions; this includes
deficits in social exchanges, nonverbal communication and the ability to cultivate the necessary
skills needed to develop, maintain and understand relationships (APA 2013). Baron-Cohen,
Leslie and Firth (1985) proposed an idea that explained these pervasive social impairments - the
notion that children with autism lack the development of second-order representations, and
therefore lack a crucial aspect of social skills described by the term ‘theory of mind’ The ability
to assume behavioral outcomes in another individual could be considered an essential skill that
promotes appropriate social interaction and his idea inherently links the lack of a ToM to the
impairment seen in a child with autism’s social skills. In addition, if lacking a ToM is
characterized as an underlying factor of an individual with autism’s underdeveloped social skills,
then it can also be associated with an individual with autism’s inability to engage in appropriate
social exchanges and can be assumed that individuals with autism are also incapable of showing
appropriate levels of empathy.
In their experiment, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) examined 20 diagnosed children with
autism as per the established criteria, 14 children with Down syndrome, and 27 typically
developing preschool children, all of similar mental ages. The experiment involved a method
now known as the Sally-Ann test. The experimenter tells the child a story, in which a doll named
Sally places a marble in her basket, and then briefly leaves the room. In the time of the first
doll’s absence, a second doll, named Ann, takes the marble out of the basket and places it into
her box. When Sally returns, the experimenter asks the child the question “where will the first
doll look for the marble?” If the child answers with the marble’s new location, they fail to
7

account for the first dolls belief of the marble’s location. The results of this experiment show
that, unlike the groups of children with Down Syndrome and typically developing preschool
children, who pointed to where the marble was in the first place (which was the response that the
researchers were looking for), the group of children with diagnosed autism consistently pointed
to where the marble was relocated. Failure of the children with autism to provide the desired
answer was neither attributed to random pointing or memory impairments. Rather, it was
concluded that the children with autism merely did not accept the difference between their own
and the doll’s knowledge. These results suggested that the group of children with autism failed to
exhibit ToM.
Up until the late 1990’s, studies that focused on testing ToM all concurrently hit a limit
where the only participants being tested were those of a mental age of about 6. Since these tests
only seemed to be administered to children or those with the mental age of children, it would
have been wrong to assume that all individuals with autism lacked a ToM ability. It made sense
to administer such tests to individuals with the developmental age of an adult, who still exhibited
some form of ASD, to test if the results of the studies conducted with children applied to anyone
with ASD. Thus, a comparable study attempted to test for ToM on higher functioning adults
diagnosed with autism (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). In this study,
three groups of adults were tested; 16 participants with ASD, 50 typically functioning adults, and
10 adults with Tourette’s syndrome. All groups were exposed to the same “Eye Task” test. This
particular test consisted of 25 different pictures of faces. Each picture only showed a portion of
each face, from midway along the nose to a little bit above the eye brows (just enough to see the
facial expression in the persons eyes). Each participant was shown each picture for
approximately 3 seconds and were asked to pick, from two words that were given, which one
8

best described the expression on the face. For example, a picture would be shown and the
participant would be asked to pick between the words “concerned” or “unconcerned” to describe
the face. Two controls of gender recognition and basic emotion recognition were also
administered to all of the participants to make sure that the deficits of the eye task were not due
to alternative factors. The results of this study indicated that adults with autism also
demonstrated impaired ToM.

Section IV: Social Robotics and ASD Therapies
If an autistic child’s inability to develop a theory of mind is said to cause such severe
impairment in social skills, then how does this reflect an autistic individual’s ability to interact
with modern technology? It is not uncommon in this day and age to encounter a multitude of
artificially intelligent objects, much of which have been accepted and even incorporated into
daily life. Many modern devices that are automated or contain some form of artificial
intelligence (AI) have shown a great deal of positive response from society, mainly due to the
convenience and ease that these objects continuously provide. A few examples of basic everyday
encounters with AI include things such as the voice activation in cell phones (i.e. the popular use
of SIRI on iPhones and Apple products) with automated responses, social media sites that use
algorithms to learn your interests and preferences in order display advertisements that will strike
your appeal, or even video games and voice activated game consoles. Aside from basic
examples, there also exist entities that display a more complex form of AI, such as Cleverbot- a
web application that uses an intelligent algorithm that allows it to have naturalistic conversations
with humans by learning from the interaction and responses.
It is important to inquire whether or not an autistic individual is able to appropriately
interact with AI because, in recent years, a major developing application for social robotics has
9

been incorporating it into certain therapies that gear towards assisting children with ASD
(Cabibihan, Javed, Ang Jr., & Aljunied 2013). Through online interactive games and similarly
engaging activities, these socially interactive robots are used to relate with these children, by
creating enticing and relatable situations, making a child feel compelled to interact. The main
goal is to target the technology behind robotics towards training these children in certain skills
that provoke desired behaviors through a system that displays encouragement as well as positive
feedback when a task is completed without fail (Cabibihan et al. 2013). One of the most
promising applications of this technology is using these social robotics as an alternative way for
a child to practice “context-appropriate” social skills; because an autistic child’s social skills are
underdeveloped, these robots serve as a chance for a child with ASD to exercise appropriate
behaviors through indirect experiences (Cabibihan et al. 2013). Additional advantages to
incorporating social robotics in a clinical setting include the fact that robots can be programmed
to adapt and allow individualized treatment specific to each child. Furthermore, there appears to
be an inherent appeal to robotics among the individuals who lie within the autism spectrum
(Diehl, Schmitt, Villano & Crowell, 2012). Welch, Lahiri, Warren, and Sarkar (2010) showed
that virtual robots were judged to be effective as experimental social stimuli for children with
ASD and concluded that this type of research may be able to develop a better understanding of
the susceptibilities of social communication in children with ASD. Robots can be programmed
in a way that allows their interactions to generate a response from a child that promotes positive
prosocial behavior. This may even be useful for promoting enjoyment in social activities for
children with ASD (Diehl, Schmitt, Villano & Crowell, 2012). Furthermore, research suggests
that robots can potentially be used as a diagnostic tool. A robot could be designed in a way that
would provoke a set of social responses in reaction to a set of social pressures. The diagnosis

10

would be attained by measuring the presence, absence, or quality of the child’s overall response.
Scassellati (2007) also proposed the idea of using social robots as a diagnostic tool. With a wide
range of anthropomorphic characteristics, these robots are expected to generate positive
responses from children in terms of motivation and engagement (Scassellati, 2007). Although
there are extensive studies that explore the effects of certain robotic interaction levels on
typically developed adults, “very little is known about how individuals with autism respond to
these design dimensions” (Scassellati, 2007, p. 3).
With so much potential for the incorporation of robotics and AI in ASD therapy it is,
again, important to inquire about the interactions between these children and these robotic
technologies. Do these interactions entail the same type of social psychological mechanisms as
person-to-person interaction? Do the children engage in social perception and cognition toward
social robots? And lastly, if there is such a thing as differences in ToM or lack thereof, what role
does it play in human-robot interaction and account for differences in the uncanny valley
experience?

Section V: Hypothesis
Are individual differences in theory of mind capable of causing individual differences in
the experience of the uncanny valley? Although there is little to no research verifying that
individual differences in the uncanny valley exist, perhaps differing states of ToM is an
underlying aspect that should be considered.
It is apparent that studies have suggested differences in ToM between individuals with
ASD and typically developed individuals. So, what occurs when an autistic individual, said to
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lack a properly developed theory of mind, interacts with the same entities that give typically
developed humans that uncanny feeling? If a fully developed theory of mind is a crucial part of
what allows us to make mental attributions of these robots, and if the Uncanny Valley is a result
of attributing mind to these realistic entities, and if the “underdeveloped theory of mind” idea is a
valid explanation for the setbacks seen in autism, then it can be predicted that those with ASD
will not experience the Uncanny Valley phenomenon. Similar results are expected if we measure
a similar construct such as empathy. If empathy proves to be a valid component of the emotion
that is experienced through the uncanny valley, then we can also predict that those with low
empathy will also be unable to experience the uncanny valley phenomenon, or at least react to a
lesser degree.
As a preliminary investigation of this hypothesis, we will examine healthy adults’
reactions to potentially uncanny stimuli. While we will not study those with ASD, we will
measure the participants with two scales. The Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) will be used to
measure autistic-like traits in the group of participants, and the Basic empathy scale (BES) will
be used to separately measure the levels of empathy in the same group of participants. If
differences in ToM appear in those with ASD and those without, then it is also possible that
another related concept, such as empathy, may also account for individual differences in ToM
and there for individual differences in the uncanny valley.
We hypothesize that those who score high on the ASQ will experience the uncanny
valley to a lesser degree than those who score low on the ASQ. Likewise, those who score high
on the BES will be expected to reflect a higher sensitivity to the uncanny valley than those who
exhibit lower empathy scores.

12

Method
Participants
Participants (N = 217) were recruited how, need to describe from a large southeastern
university in the US using an online recruitment system managed by the university. Participants
were undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses and received extra or partial course
credit in exchange for participation. All participants provided consent in which they agreed to all
of the terms and conditions of the study via a form that was electronically administered to each
participant prior to beginning the actual survey. All protocols were approved by the university
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Materials
Participants viewed and rated 40 images of robots, ranging from friendly non-humanlike
robots to various humanlike or unfriendly robots (See Appendix A). These images were
randomly selected from an internet search that aimed to collect a wide range of robotic images
and representations. Each image was rated according to these 5 questions: 1) I would feel
comfortable being near this robot, 2) I would feel comfortable interacting with this robot, 3) I
would dread it if I knew I had to meet this robot, 4) I feel positive feelings about this robot, and
5) I think it might be fun to interact with this robot. For each individual image, these five
questions were displayed by a matrix which allowed each of them to be ranked on a 5-point
likert scale; the five ranks range from agree, strongly agree, neutral, disagree and strongly
disagree (see Appendix B). Each question was capable of earning a total of 5 points – because of
the negative nature of the third question in comparison to the others, each third question for each
image was reverse coded in order to be scored in the same manner as the other four questions.
Each question having a total worth for 5 points made for a possible sum of 25 points for the total
ranking of each image.
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Participants completed the 20-item Basic Empathy Scale (BES) (Jolliffe & Farrington,
2006) (see Appendix D). This test served as an operational definition of theory of mind, as it
measured the participants’ abilities to both experience and comprehend the emotional states of
others. Participants also completed the 50-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) (BaronCohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) (see Appendix C). While not diagnostic
of ASD, it has been shown to detect autism-like traits in the normal population. All materials
were presented using an online survey management platform managed by the university.
Procedure
Participants who volunteered for the experiment using the recruitment system were
provided a link to the survey. After providing consent, the participants viewed each of the 40
images, one per page, in a random order. Each image was accompanied by the five rating
questions. Subsequent to the image ratings, participants completed the BES and ASQ, in that
order, and were thanked for their participation.
Results
Of the 217 participants who attempted the survey, several were removed. One
participant failed to complete the ASQ and also skipped two images without rating them. Six
participants completed the entire survey in under 10 minutes. In comparison to the average
completion time of approximately 18 minutes, we judged that completion times under 10
minutes reflected participants who hurried through the survey and were unlikely to have given
honest and thoughtful responses. Data from the remaining 210 participants were thus included in
the subsequent analyses. The BES and ASQ scales were scored according to the original authors’
instructions. The data that was collected for the ASQ displayed a near normal distribution across
participants (M=18.79, SD=4.97) with a range of 28.00. The data from the BES also resulted in a
near normal distribution (M=75.91, SD=8.94) with a range of 47.00. Based on the data collected
14

from the BES and the ASQ, the participants were divided into groups based on their scores.
There was a significant negative correlation between the BES and ASQ scales, r = -.18, p = .008.
The scores for both questionnaires were ranked, and the top 1/4th and the bottom 1/4th
percentiles for both surveys were then determined. The lower quarter of the BES cut off at a
score of 69 and the upper quarter cut off at a score of 81. Likewise, the lower quarter of the ASQ
cut off at a score of 15 and the upper quarter cut off at a score of 22. This led to the creation of
four different groups, low (n = 54) and high (n = 58) empathy, and low (n = 56) and high (n =
60) ASQ score. Participants whose responses fell between the low and high Cutoff scores for
either group were excluded from the analyses.
The sums of the ratings of the robot image were determined and the averages for each
photo were calculated from the sums. The average rating for each image was compared to the
scores that each participant received on both the ASQ and the BES. When comparing image
ratings in terms of the low and high ASQ groups, there were no significant differences. The
graph shown in Figure 2 shows a linear distribution for the means in both groups. The linear fit
regression lines for both groups are almost equal in slope.
However, when the mean image ratings of the two BES groups were compared, a
significant difference was apparent. Those whose scores reflected high empathy found some of
the images significantly more unpleasant than those with lower empathy scores. The regression
line for the group with higher empathy shows a steeper slope than that of the low empathy group.
This relationship can be seen in the graph in Figure 3. In addition, two-tailed independent group
t-tests were performed between several of the images between the low and high BES groups.
Using a corrected alpha (p < .01) due to multiple comparisons, significant differences were found
for images 6, 22, 47, and 52.
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Figure 2 Mean image ratings for each image, sorted from highest to lowest mean overall rating.
Separate lines indicate the lowest and highest scores on the ASQ scale.
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Figure 3 Mean image ratings for each image, sorted from highest to lowest mean overall rating,
with separate lines for low and high BES groups.
Discussion
The results found in this study were not enough to support the claim that autistic
individuals do not experience the uncanny valley, though we have some evidence that theory of
mind may be linked to the uncanny valley.
We used the ASQ as an artificial way to create an operational “autistic”
population for our study, and failed to find differences in negative reactions to robots (or robotic
images in the case of this experiment) as a function of those who scored high and low on this
scale. While the ASQ may detect certain autism-like traits, it may not be an accurate test of ToM
or ASD, and thus failed to detect characteristics relevant to the social perception of robots.
Alternatively, it may be the case that autistic characteristics are not as directly linked to ToM as
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Baron-Cohen, et al. (1985) originally predicted. This is, of course, assuming that the uncanny
valley is a product of a properly developed ToM. These results may also be explained by the fact
that we did not directly test a group of ASD diagnosed individuals; it is possible that different
results may become apparent if this hypothesis was tested on actual autistic individuals. This
type of work is necessary to clarify the interpretations of our negative findings regarding the
ASQ.
We did, however, find significant results when comparing the individual image ratings to
the BES. There was a significant difference in how some of these images were perceived
between the groups of participants who had high empathy scores, and those who had low
empathy scores. Those with higher recorded empathy perceived some of the more unpleasant
looking images more negatively than those with low empathy scores. It’s understandable that the
uncanny valley responds positively when compared to levels of empathy. It is possible that the
uncomfortable feeling one goes through when experiencing the uncanny valley is linked to
emotional responses- certain images will either make you feel positive emotions or negative
emotions towards them. To the extent that empathy may be a component of theory of mind, we
thus have tentative support for the idea that theory of mind is part of the uncanny response.
As previously mentioned, social robotics are being used in therapies that can help
enhance an autistic child’s social skills and serve as a way to practice using appropriate social
interaction tactics. Research on social perception of robots has shown that people can respond
appropriately to different social cues exhibited by robots (Fiore, Wiltshire, Lobato, Jentsch, &
Axelrod, 2013). However, these studies have not taken into account individual differences in
terms of empathy or theory of mind, and our findings suggest that continued work in social
robots must incorporate these differences, and seek to clarify other factors that may influence
18

social perceptions. Typically developed individuals are usually aware of their interactions with
human-like robotics and are aware of the social cues that trigger their perceptions of said
interactions. The significant scores shown through comparison to the Basic Empathy Scale
highlight a link between empathy, and the perceptions of social cues from a robot. It may be
likely that when studies are done on individuals and their perceptions of robots, the levels of
empathy in each participant might also need to be taken into consideration.
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APPENDIX A: Images shown on the Individual rating scales, organized by the
averages of the scores they were given, from highest score (more positively
perceived) to lowest score ( more negatively perceived)
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Images used by the researchers in the image rating survey
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Q6

APPENDIX B: sample of the scoring system for each individual image
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APPENDIX C: The Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ)
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The Autistic-Spectrum Quotient
Note: Answer choices for all items is:
definitely
agree

slightly
agree

slightly
disagree

definitely
disagree

1. I prefer to do things with others rather
than on my own.
2. I prefer to do things the same way over
and over again.
3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very
easy to create a picture in my mind.
4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one
thing that I lose sight of other things.
5. I often notice small sounds when others do not.
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar
strings of information.
7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve
said is impolite, even though I think it is polite.
8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine
what the characters might look like.
9. I am fascinated by dates.
10. In a social group, I can easily keep track of
several different people’s conversations.
11. I find social situations easy.
12. I tend to notice details that others do not.
13. I would rather go to a library than a party.
14. I find making up stories easy.
15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people
than to things.
16. I tend to have very strong interests, which
I get upset about if I can’t pursue.
17. I enjoy social chit-chat.
18. When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to
get a word in edgeways.
19. I am fascinated by numbers.
20. When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to
work out the characters’ intentions.
21. I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction.
22. I find it hard to make new friends.
23. I notice patterns in things all the time.
24. I would rather go to the theatre than a museum.
25. It does not upset me if my daily routine
is disturbed.
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26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep
a conversation going.
27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when
someone is talking to me.
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture,
rather than the small details.
29. I am not very good at remembering phone numbers.
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation,
or a person’s appearance.
31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me
is getting bored.
32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once.
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s
my turn to speak.
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously.
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke.
36. I find it easy to work out what someone is
thinking or feeling just by looking at their face.
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to
what I was doing very quickly.
38. I am good at social chit-chat.
39. People often tell me that I keep going on and
on about the same thing.
40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games
involving pretending with other children.
41. I like to collect information about categories
of things (e.g. types of car, types of bird,
types of train, types of plant, etc.).
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be
like to be someone else.
43. I like to plan any activities I participate in carefully.
44. I enjoy social occasions.
45. I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions.
46. New situations make me anxious.
47. I enjoy meeting new people.
48. I am a good diplomat.
49. I am not very good at remembering
people’s date of birth.
50. I find it very easy to play games with
children that involve pretending.
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APPENDIX D: Basic Empathy Scale (BES)
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BASIC EMPATHY SCALE

The following are characteristics that may or may not apply to you. Please circle one answer
for each statement to indicate how much you agree or disagree. Please answer as honestly as
you can.
1. My friend’s emotions don’t affect me much.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

2. After being with a friend who is sad about something, I usually feel sad.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

3. I can understand my friend’s happiness when she/he does well at something.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

4. I get frightened when I watch characters in a good scary movie.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

5. I get caught up in other people’s feelings easily.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

6. I find it hard to know when my friends are frightened.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

7. I don’t become sad when I see other people crying.
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STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

8. Other people’s feelings don’t bother me at all.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

9. When someone is feeling ‘down’ I can usually understand how they feel.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

10. I can usually figure out when my friends are scared.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

11. I often become sad when watching sad things on TV or in films.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

12. I can often understand how people are feeling even before they tell me.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

13. Seeing a person who has been angered has no effect on my feelings.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY

14. I can usually figure out when people are cheerful.
STRONGL
Y

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
31

DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

AGREE

15. I tend to feel scared when I am with friends who are afraid.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

AGRE
E

STRONG
LY
AGREE

16. I can usually realize quickly when a friend is angry.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

17. I often get swept up in my friend’s feelings.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

18. My friend’s unhappiness doesn’t make me feel anything.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

19. I am not usually aware of my friend’s feelings
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE

20. I have trouble figuring out when my friends are happy.
STRONGL
Y
DISAGRE
E

DISAGREE

NEITHER AGREE
NOR
DISAGREE
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